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Abstract.—This paper uses panel data from the pan-European SHARE
survey to study labor market behavior of older male self-employed vis-
a-vis wage employed workers.
We find the self-employed to work longer hours, to be more
flexible in their hours allocation, and to retire later in all countries.
We relate these differences in observed behavior to individual char-
acteristics, economic resources, and to documented cross-national
variation in labor market and social security institutions. Differential
incentives matter for the retirement behavior of the self-employed.
We also provide evidence of the self-employed not wanting to retire
as early as possible, and contrast these expectation data with realized
retirement transitions. The overall picture that emerges is that older
self-employed have a very strong labor market attachment and they
use their degrees of freedom to work more and retire later accordingly.
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1 Introduction
Among the occupational, life-cycle career choices that individuals can make, the decision
whether or not to become self-employed so as to engage in entrepreneurial activity is par-
ticularly important and has received corresponding academic interest. Much less is known
about labor market choices and retirement behavior of the self-employed when the end of
the working life cycle draws nearer.
Studying the older self-employeds’ behavior is interesting and important since (i) they
need to provide to a much larger extent for their own retirement, and (ii) they consti-
tute a very heterogeneous group comprising not only successful entrepreneurs but also
marginalized workers that have difficulties finding regular employment, or do not have
access to comparable pension provisions as employees. The self-employed hence form
a potential target group for government policy. (iii) Self-employment offers much larger
flexibility in terms of labor supply and retirement choices. Self-employeds’ behavior can
thus be meaningfully studied in comparison to wage employees whose choice set is ar-
guably restricted.
Selection into self-employment and entrepreneurial start-up has been investigated in
a number of contributions (for instance, Evans and Jovanovich, 1989; Blanchflower and
Oswald, 1998), as has survival in self-employment (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Taylor, 1999).
Studies on self-employment exit into retirement are scarce (Parker and Rougier, 2007).
Some attention has been paid to self-employment being a bridge job mode on the way to
complete retirement (Quinn, 1980; Fuchs, 1982).
Conversely, typical retirement studies either explicitly exclude the self-employed, or
are silent about inclusion (Berkovec and Stern, 1991, Blau, 1994, Diamond and Hausman,
1984, Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984, Meghir and Whitehouse, 1997, Ruhm, 1990, Stock
and Wise, 1990), or do not pay particular attention to them (Gustman and Steinmeier,
2001; Maestas, 2010; Peracchi and Welch, 1994). Labor supply studies almost exclusively
focus on wage employees (see the references in Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
This paper investigates hours worked, retirement options and retirement behavior of
the self-employed using comparable micro data from eleven OECD countries. The data is
drawn from the first two waves of the SHARE project, an international data collection effort
on health and retirement issues in Europe. The sampled population are residents aged 50
and above, making the survey largely comparable to its well-known older US sibling, the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
The present paper not only contributes to narrowing the gap in knowledge about work
and retirement behavior of older self-employed in comparison to wage employees, but
also contains other additions to the existing relevant literature. First, it uses very suitable
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and unique data that are tailored to studying labor market behavior at older working ages,
as well as retirement behavior of individuals, and provide a relatively large cross sectional
base. Secondly, the data used is very informative not only on labor market status but also
on a number of relevant characteristics such as industry (and occupation), accumulated
wealth, income, and health, and answers to a battery of self-evaluation questions. Our
goodness of fit statistics show that we can explain a substantial degree of the observed
variance through our observed variables.
The data contains information on wishes and expectations for future retirement, and
the panel structure of the data enables us to analyze individual transitions. Lastly, since
the data is based on samples from a number of different European countries, part of the
variation in the data is arguably due to differences in pension rules and retirement regimes
that treat the self-employed differently from wage employees, and possibly differently
so in different countries. We can then focus on studying the residual variation due to
individual characteristics.
Our main findings are that the self-employed aged 50 and over are more flexible in
their hours allocation and work substantially more hours per week. They are much less
keen on retiring as early as possible, and actually do retire later.
One potential reason for later retirement is lower access to pension benefits. We docu-
ment differences across countries with a large variation in institutional rules. In addition,
we exploit information at the individual level on availability of future pension benefits,
and can thus control for differences between employees and self-employed pension rights
as a reason to retire.
Another possible way to explain differences in work and retirement behavior are sys-
tematic differences in health status. There is reason to believe that career selfemployment
is driven by selective characteristics, and innate health and morbidity may impact on the
occupational choice early in life. Those who are healthier might be both more willing and
able to select into employment modes that require long hours and many years. We can,
using our data, control for a range of different health measurements and therefore control
for long-run health dynamics at the individual level.
A final channel to explain differences is wealth: the self-employed may have accumu-
lated perhaps lower levels of savings that can be used to finance consumption in older
ages, everything else equal. Information on individual net worth is available. The self-
employed hold on average more wealth. But even after instrumentation to account for
potential endogeneity, differences in wealth are not main drivers of differences in behav-
ior.
All this suggests that much more than institutional restrictions and financial incentives
to retire play a role. The remaining variation may plausibly be explained by deriving
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particular, intangible benefits from working on own account. Hamilton (2000) has stressed
such compensating differentials to explain the shortfall of earnings in self-employment
compared to wage employment.
Main patterns of hours, labor force participation and retirement across employment
modes are similar after accounting for country fixed effects. Indeed, a brief check with
data from the HRS (wave 2004) corroborates the main patterns for the United States. This
may indicate that just looking at European data is not actually restrictive.
Section 2 introduces data and presents descriptive statistics, Section 3 contains regres-
sion results. Short conclusions are offered in Section 4.
2 Data and Descriptives
2.1 Sample
The micro data we analyze are from the pan-European SHARE project.1 This is a panel
data survey, currently with 2 waves in public release. The data covers 15 countries from
various European regions.2 We focus on the 11 countries that were part of the survey in
both waves. The first wave sample was drawn in 2004 (and for Belgium and subsamples
of France and Greece in 2005), the second wave in 2006/2007.3
The sample is representative of the population aged 50 and above in any one coun-
try. Purpose of the survey is to help obtain a detailed picture of health and retirement
related issues for the population covered. The data design is inspired by and most closely
resembles the familiar US Health and Retirement Study.
Relevant domains covered in the SHARE survey are employment and work history,
income, consumption, wealth, and health. Amounts of income and wealth concepts used
in this paper have been converted to Euros and corrected for differences in purchasing
power across countries.4
For the study of labor supply and retirement related issues of the self-employed, the
unique data source has a number of strengths deserving emphasis. One aspect is sam-
ple size. In a typical cross sectional data set with a handful of thousands of observations,
only a small subset of people will be in the relevant age range, and an even smaller one
will be self-employed. The literature on self-employment indicates that there is substan-
1To be specific, we data release R2.3.0 of November 13, 2009.
2 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In addition, a sample from Israel is also included in the data base.
3Countries Czech Republic, Poland, and Ireland, were added as per the second wave. Israel was only
included in the first wave.
4Germany in 2004 is the base country and year. Using deflated Euro amounts instead does not lead to
differences, however. We use country dummies in all regressions.
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tial heterogeneity in terms of who becomes and who stays self-employed. It is therefore
instrumental to characterize workers in many observables ways. Importantly, we observe
age, demographics and other household background characteristics, wealth, income, in-
dustry and occupation. The fact that we have data from many countries yields in addition
institutional variation in retirement and pension systems that is worth emphasizing.
The full SHARE sample of the 11 countries considered consists of 28,517 respondents in
19,548 households. We shall in this paper focus on heads of households and thus not con-
sider multiple individuals from the same household. We define as head of household the
oldest male in the household among the following persons: the coverscreen respondent,
or his or her spouse or partner.5
We focus on males for two main reaons. Labor force participation rates are compara-
tively higher for males in the age group of just over 50 years. Self-employment is in most
countries a male-dominated mode of activity, and particularly so at older ages. Removing
females and non-heads of households leaves us with 12,524 observations. Of these, 10,525
are in the age range 50-75. The age restriction is chosen to allow for an analysis of labor
market behavior beyond standard retirement age. At all ages we find people working and
being retired.6
Labor market status is self-reported. Conditional on labor force participation, self-
employment is elicited by way of self report. The definition includes those working for
a family business. We also include among the self-employed those that report one self-
employed activity out of possibly two jobs.
Table 1 shows variable means of labor market variables and household characteristics,
split into two subsamples according to retiree status. A little more than half of the sample
is retired at the time of interview, around 40% works for money.
The non-retired are on average nearly 56 years old, 84% work (possibly next to be-
ing unemployed, disabled, or out of the labor force), and more than a quarter of those
working is self-employed. 38% of household heads in this subsample hold what might be
called a ‘high school’ degree, 26% have a ‘college degree’.7 Three quarters are married (or
partnered). Chronic health conditions and sickness symptoms are widespread.
Comparing the non-retirees with the retirees we see differences that are in line with
expectations. Retirees are a good 10 years older. 6.5% of retirees work. Educational dif-
5We have alternatively considered to condition on the household member’s role as financial respondent,
which is the person who is deemed financially most knowledgeable in the household. Doing so reduces the
number of observations without substantially altering results.
6There are very few people working beyond age 75, and most of our analyses pertains to those working.
7Education systems differ widely between countries and have changed substantially over the decades.
SHARE researchers expended large efforts at measuring education in a comparable way. All education dummy
variables used are based on the United Nations ISCED-97 classification.
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics (Sample Means)
Variable non-ret. retirees
age 55.75 66.39
(previously) self-emp. 0.148
self-employed 0.263
works 0.839 0.065
unemployed 0.104 —
disabled 0.079 —
other labor force 0.002 —
out of labor force 0.008 —
edu.: none 0.038 0.075
edu.: primary 0.136 0.262
edu.: (lower) secondary 0.130 0.129
edu.: (upper) secondary 0.381 0.345
edu.: post-sec., non-tertiary 0.022 0.012
edu.: 1st tertiary 0.261 0.164
edu.: 2nd tertiary 0.023 0.007
edu.: other 0.007 0.005
foreign-born 0.116 0.108
household size 2.560 2.135
marital st.: couple 0.762 0.801
marital st.: nvr. married 0.096 0.071
marital st.: widowed 0.029 0.072
marital st.: div./sep. 0.113 0.056
other hh income (100k EUR) 0.258 0.403
private net worth (m EUR) 0.360 0.285
long-term sickness 0.402 0.532
number of chronic conditions 1.011 1.581
number of symptoms 0.978 1.279
body mass index 26.68 27.06
Notes: SHARE sample of male household heads, age 50-
75. Subsample non-retired: 5,072 obs.; self-employed con-
ditional on working; ‘works’ includes e.g., disabled and un-
employed that work nevertheless. Retiree sample: 5,453 obs.
Variables in both subsamples may contain different numbers
of missing values. Education level according to United Na-
tions ISCED coding. Weighted statistics.
5
ferences will partly be due to generational differences, whereas health will be strongly
influenced by age, and differences in family composition and marital status will result
from both age and cohort effects. Retirees hold less wealth, but command over higher
‘other household income’—this excludes earnings of the head of household; use of this
income concept explains the positive difference between samples.
2.2 Labor Force Participation and Self-employment
Strong inter-country differences can be found in Table 2 showing both labor force partici-
pation and self-employment rates from our SHARE sample.
Table 2: Labor Force Participation & Self-employment Rates
Age 50-RA 55-64 ≥ RA
country LFP SE SEN LFP SE SEN LFP SE
Austria 52.4 20.4 16.9 37.6 19.8 17.8 6.6 18.8
Belgium 61.9 20.1 17.1 48.7 25.2 20.5 5.4 54.8
Switzerland 85.8 30.9 23.2 81.0 34.4 27.1 30.9 59.7
Germany 73.6 20.4 17.2 60.7 24.4 21.2 8.6 44.6
Denmark 79.2 20.9 13.6 71.9 21.5 15.5 18.5 18.8
Spain 70.6 30.8 30.0 61.8 30.3 29.7 4.7 37.1
France 82.3 18.7 16.5 51.4 21.3 17.9 9.3 33.8
Greece 76.4 46.0 43.7 65.0 47.2 45.7 13.9 64.0
Italy 58.5 44.8 43.0 47.2 50.7 48.6 8.4 68.2
Netherlands 70.4 15.3 12.6 58.6 16.0 13.3 5.1 47.6
Sweden 82.6 23.1 17.7 75.8 23.2 17.8 14.7 48.7
Notes: SHARE sample of male heads of household, age 50-75. LFP: labor force
participation rate. SE: total self-employment rate (includes workers with another
job as wage employee), SEN: net self-employment rate (excludes workers with
another job as employee). RA: standard (social security) retirement age.
We split the sample according to broad age groups. The first considers individuals
below standard retirement age.8 Labor force participation rates range from a low 52.4% in
Austria to a high 85.8% in Switzerland.
Labor force participation seems uncorrelated in the cross section with total self-employ-
ment rates (including self-employment from second jobs) that range from a low 15.3% in
the Netherlands to a high 46% in Greece. Column 3 of the Table only counts those as self-
employed that do not also have a second job as wage employed. Only few people work
both in wage employment and self-employment, although there are country-specific dif-
ferences.
8Standard retirement age for public pensions in 2003 for males was 65 in almost all cases, France being the
exception with 60 years. There is slightly more variation for females, see Duval (2003).
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The main impression gained from these numbers confirms the picture from OECD
statistics9 for all age groups that show pronounced and persistent differences in self-
employment rates across countries. Mediterranean countries have in general very high
self-employment rates, Northern countries very low ones, compared to Western or Central
Europe. In addition, most countries show a decline in total self-employment over much of
the 1990’s and early 2000’s. Levels and downward trend differ heavily by industry com-
position, however, as self-employment rates are lower across the board in non-agriculture,
with a mitigated downward trend.
The next set of columns of Table 2 shows values for the pre-retirement age group of 55-
64 years. The last couple of columns focus on the population above standard retirement
age. Among those few workers that work after standard retirement age, a very large share
tends to be self-employed. Differences between countries become even more pronounced,
in terms of both labor force participation and self-employment.
Figure 1 plots labor force participation rates and self-employment rates as a function
of age.10 Age is on the horizontal axis, with the origin at standard retirement age. Many
countries exhibit increasing self-employment rates with age, mirroring the decreasing la-
bor force participation rate. These figures suggest that the self-employed have a lower
conditional exit rate than wage earners.11
Figure 1 about here
For comparison, Table 3 reports published data, partly based on OECD statistics. The
first three columns show labor force participation rates of older men (55-64) in 2003 and
2000 and effective retirement ages in 2000.
The 2003 labor force participation rates from Table 3 can be directly compared with
the corresponding figures in Table 2, column 4. Whereas there are many countries where
labor force participation rates from both sources are very close, it appears that SHARE
(partly drastically) oversamples the active population in Belgium, Greece and Germany,
and undersamples it in Austria compared to OECD data.
Between-country patterns of labor force participation have been documented in Gru-
9OECD data are readily available from www.sourceoecd.org. Parker and Robson (2004) provide
time-series analysis on aggregate OECD statistics.
10These are cross-sectional nonparametric regressions. Since the data is very sparse at higher ages, we use
a data-adaptive smoother, Koehler et al. (1997).
11See Haider and Loughran (2010) for a similar picture using US data. The alternative of a larger inflow
into self-employment at older ages than into wage employment can be ruled out by the evidence provided in
Table 7 that we discuss below. The cause of a lower exit rate may have to do with differential characteristics
leading to different selection effects out of the labor force for self-employed versus wage employed (unob-
served heterogeneity) instead of differences in employment hazards. Our regression analyses below suggest
that selection through unobservables may still play some role.
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Table 3: Labor Force Participation and Retirement Incentives
2003 2000
LFP LFP ERA RR IT RR IT TFR]
country M, 55-64? M, 55-64? M† at age 60‡ at age 65‡
Austria 42.3 44.5 58.8 0 9 72 68 n.a.
Belgium 39.4 36.3 57.8 49 47 52 55 9.0
Switzerland 79.5 79.3 62.5 22 22 63 19 n.a.
Germany 52.0 52.4 60.8 17 18 48 0 3.5
Denmark 70.8 64.5 61.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain 62.9 60.5 61.0 59 33 82 92 2.5
France a47.0 41.7 58.7 61 51 71 71 7.4
Greece 60.7 57.3 62.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Italy 44.4 42.7 59.5 70 21 95 88 9.3
Netherlands 58.7 50.8 59.2 b80 b94 61 0 9.0
Sweden 75.5 72.8 62.1 43 35 78 44 2.2
Sources: ?OECD (2004), Table C, a2002; †Duval (2003), Fig. 1, ‡Figs. 2 and 4, approx. values;
]Gruber and Wise (2004), approx. values. Notes: bbased on ‘VUT’ ER plans; LFP–Labor force
participation rate, ERA–effective retirement age, RR–replacement rate, IT–implicit tax in old
age pension systems on continued work, TFR–tax force to retire (cumulated IT from early
retirement age to age 69).
ber and Wise (1998) and Blo¨ndal and Scarpetta (1999), using somewhat older data. Labor
force participation decreased. Our comparison with the year 2000 in column 2 shows a
noticeable increase in labor force participation. Austria appears to be the only country
where participation of older males has noticeably declined between 2000 and 2003.
Columns four through seven of Table 3 show retirement incentives in public pension
systems, calculated by Duval (2003). Two scenarios are compared: retirement at age 60
and at age 65. The Table shows pension/earnings replacement rates at these ages and the
implicit tax if people choose to work longer (in 2000). Again, there is substantial variation
across countries. Many countries have a large disincentive to work beyond standard re-
tirement age of 65.12 This is particularly true for countries such as Austria, France, Italy or
Spain, where the implicit tax lies in the range of 68%-92%. The same countries also have
rather high replacement rates of 71%-95%. Countries where such disincentives are absent,
like the Netherlands or Germany, have substantially lower replacement rates of 61% and
44%, respectively.13 Early retirement is also often possible, at least for workers. Again,
12‘Implicit tax’ refers to the ratio of social security wealth accrual from working one more year and net
earnings. In most countries, actuarially unfair systems have social security wealth decline with age, from
which a strong incentive to retire early derives.
13These replacement rates refer to before-tax incomes; after-tax replacement rates tend to be substantially
higher, and can exceed 100%, especially in countries such as Italy.
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substantial disincentive effects of working beyond the earliest possible retirement age are
prevalent in many countries. These early retirement incentives contribute to the large gap
between standard and actual retirement ages.14 Gruber and Wise (1998, 2004) prefer to
sum the implicit tax over a number of ages around retirement to assess the impact of the
‘tax force to retire’; their numbers are replicated in column eight of our Table, indicating
the strongest incentives for Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
2.3 Self-employed and Wage Employed Workers
Returning to SHARE data, Table 4 splits the working sample into self-employed and wage
employed and tabulates industry affiliation and occupation (see Section C.1 for details on
definitions). Stark differences exist between both groups.
The self-employed are particularly strongly represented in agriculture, wholesale and
retail, and in various ‘other’ categories. We use a separate category for ‘missing industry’
(good for almost 10% of the sample) to capture the fact that not all observations could be
consistently coded into industry affiliation. This appears to be more of an issue for the self-
employed. In terms of occupation, the self-employed are particularly prone to be classified
as having an administrative or managerial function, but also to be ‘skilled farm workers’.
Elementary occupations including clerks and operators are quite underrepresented among
the self-employed. Again, a category ‘missing’ shows that many self-employed are not
easy to classify.
The data does not have much information on firm characteristics. One variable of
interest is firm size, the distribution of which is shown in Table 5.
Almost half of the self-employed work on their own, another two fifths employ at most
five employees. We shall return to comparing the characteristics of the self-employed and
wage workers in Section 3.1.
2.4 Labor Supply and Labor Market Dynamics
Stark differences exist between wage earners and self-employed workers in terms of actual
hours worked. Employees are often constrained in their choice of hours by institutional
(contractual) parameters.15 The self-employed are much more flexible in adjusting their
hours according to their wishes and needs. This is borne out in the density estimates
displayed in Figure 2, where we see for employees a pronounced spike around standard
14The Netherlands sticks out in this comparison, since the underlying calculations are based on an early
retirement plan (VUT) that has been phased out and replaced with an actuarially fair version (PP) whose
disincentive effects are far less pronounced, see Euwals et al. (2005).
15See Dickens and Lundberg (1993) for an empirical analysis , showing that a substantial fraction of their
sample would like to work more. Also see Martinez-Granado (2005) and references therein.
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Table 4: Industry and Occupation
Industry empl self all
agriculture & mining 1.41 4.75 2.31
manuf., low tech 16.50 10.02 14.75
manuf., high tech 7.98 4.10 6.93
supplies & construction 13.09 12.20 12.85
wholesale, retail 7.53 17.79 10.31
transp., comm., finance 11.17 5.41 9.61
other sophisticated 17.32 8.64 14.97
educ., health, soc. work 12.31 6.94 10.86
other services 5.20 8.82 6.18
other 0.94 1.49 1.09
missing 6.56 19.83 10.15
Occupation
admin./managerial 11.65 21.66 14.36
professionals 15.98 17.16 16.30
technicians 17.00 14.12 16.22
clerks 6.50 0.77 4.95
service/sales workers 5.25 4.29 4.99
skilled farm worker 1.82 12.63 4.74
craftsmen 18.12 15.64 17.45
operators 11.25 3.68 9.20
elementary occupations 7.97 2.82 6.57
other, inc. armed forces 2.01 0.65 1.64
missing 2.45 6.59 3.57
Tenure in previous job 27.35 34.18
Notes: SHARE sample of working male heads of households.
Industry and occupation: classification according to current
worker status. Tenure in previous job (years): worker status
in previous job, retiree sample. Weighted statistics. Industry
coding following NACE classification. Occupation coding
according to ISCO.
Table 5: Firm Size Distribution Self-employed
# employees %-age # employees %-age
none 48.31
1-5 39.41 25-199 1.93
6-15 7.51 200-499 0.80
16-24 1.43 500+ 0.61
Notes: SHARE sample of working male heads of households.
Weighted statistics.
hours (36-40) in each country.16 The hours distribution for the self-employed is mostly
16These estimates are substantially smoothed in the sense that the raw data reveal lots more spikes at certain,
even numbers of hours, say 15, 30, 35, 45, etc. Hours worked here is the sum of hours worked in the main job
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bell-shaped and much less peaked, with mean, median, and variance being much larger
than those for employees in each of the countries. Some countries display substantial
bimodality for the self-employed, with a smaller mode at lower hours.
Figure 2 about here
The self-employed appear to show higher labor market attachment also in terms of
job tenure. Table 4 reports average tenure on the respondent’s previous job for the retiree
sample. The (previously) self-employed have on average been 7 years longer on their job
than employees.17 The high average tenure suggest that first entry into self-employment
is made at fairly young ages.
The self-employed are not only far less constrained in their hours choice, they also
face substantially more flexibility in terms of working after retirement. One question asks
retirees whether or not their last job before retirement offered them opportunities to work
full- or part-time after the official retirement age. This is answered affirmatively by 70%
of all previously self-employed and by one third of previously wage employed men in the
sample. Notwithstanding inter-country differences in levels, the self-employed indicate
higher flexibility in every country in the sample.
This flexibility is actually used. The survey contains valuable information on the year a
pension was drawn for the first time for a wide array of different pension incomes, and we
choose the minimum of all indicated years. From here, we can tabulate average ages in Ta-
ble 6. The self-employed are older when they draw their first pension, in all countries. The
differences with employees can amount to several years in some countries, for instance,
Greece, Denmark, Spain, or the Netherlands. In most of the countries, the difference is
statistically different from zero.18
Assessing labor market dynamics is possible by using information from the second
wave of the survey. Out of the 10,525 observations in wave 1, 7,026 are also present in
wave 2.19
and possibly a second job. For a total of five observations, reported hours exceeding 140 were set to missing.
17The questionnaire does not probe whether the respondents view an intermittent business termination
and subsequenlty restarting a new venture as a change of job, or whether they associate the tenure question
as pertaining to a self-employment career. Conversely, former employees may define a change in jobs to
include a change in tasks.
18This difference will however explain only a small part of the above-noted difference in tenure between
both groups.
19There is no strong a priori evidence of selectivity from using the panel component. Classifying obser-
vations into year of birth groups, education classes, or employment mode, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the marginal distributions of these variables from the overlap sample and the wave-1-only sample are
independent. We do find strong country patterns, however, possibly indicating that data collection agencies
in different countries achieved different response rates in the wave-2 data collection effort.
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Table 6: Average Age When First Drawn Some Pension Income
or When Retired
age at first pension age at retirement
all all new retirees
country self wage test self wage self wage
Austria 58.5 57.3 0.0859 58.3 57.2 62.7* 58.4
Belgium 61.3 57.7 0.0000 61.9 59.2 62.0* 59.3
Switzerland 63.0 62.0 0.0825 64.2 62.1 65.5* 62.3*
Germany 60.8 60.0 0.0708 62.4 60.5 62.5* 62.2
Denmark 62.1 59.4 0.0280 63.4 62.6 63.5* 61.8
Spain 61.5 58.3 0.0033 62.1 59.6 63.8* 61.9
France 59.7 57.3 0.0005 60.1 58.1 61.1* 58.3
Greece 61.1 57.2 0.0000 61.0 57.1 62.0* 61.2*
Italy 56.7 55.8 0.0792 57.4 56.3 63.4* 59.3
Netherlands 60.5 56.5 0.0010 62.2 61.0 65.0* 61.1
Sweden 61.9 59.8 0.0068 61.2 61.4 60.9* 63.8
total 59.6 58.2 60.2 58.9 62.8 60.5
Notes: SHARE sample of retired male heads of households. Sample for ‘age at
retirement’: individuals present in both waves. Column test refers to p−value
of t−test that mean for self-employed exceeds mean for employees. *: < 20
obs. Weighted statistics.
The average age when retiring20 in Table 6 follows closely the average age of drawing
the first pension. The last columns of the Table consider new retirees, that is those that re-
port to have retired between both sample waves. Age at retirement increases markedly for
both self-employed and wage employees and the gap between both employment groups
widens. The pattern points to the importance of recent increases in labor force partici-
pation, and the Table documents that this appears to be especially important for the self-
employed. Overall, the figures are consistent with a lower exit rate for the self-employed
and for a decrease of that rate with time.
We confirm this explicitly by tracking labor market transitions in Table 7, where we
attribute people to labor market status ‘other’ if they are disabled, out of the labor force
or have some other non-classifiable status, but do not indicate that they work nonetheless.
Whoever works is classified into employed or self-employed.21,22
Transitions into retirement are quite important, as is employment mode persistence
among non-retirees.23 Both self-employed and wage employed have a three-quarter chance
20This information is available for wave-2 respondents.
21Note that we now exclude those from consideration that are self-employed in one out of two jobs. The
latter information is unavailable in wave 2.
22The Table ignores job-to-job transitions and instances of serial self-employment.
23Recall that spacing between waves is not uniform across countries.
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Table 7: Labor Market Transitions (%) between waves 1 and 2
Wave 2 self- wage unemp. other retired total
Wave 1 empl. empl. (obs)
self-employed 74.17 7.68 0.53 1.85 15.76 755
wage employed 2.00 76.00 1.30 2.93 17.77 2,150
unemployed 4.89 22.22 32.89 10.67 29.33 225
other 2.16 7.79 1.73 51.08 37.23 231
retired 0.97 1.77 0.12 3.51 93.62 3,388
Notes: SHARE sample of male heads of households age 50-75, present in both
waves. Cells contain row percentages, except last column (total number of obser-
vations); ‘other’ includes disabled and out of labor force. Unweighted statistics.
of staying what they are between waves, and in both cases about one sixth retires, with the
self-employed being two percentage points less likely to retire. A self-employed worker
is on average more likely to transition into wage employment than an employee would
transition into self-employment.
Retirement is not entirely absorbing as a very limited number of people finds their
way back into the labor market. The transition rates are heavily influenced by the age
distribution, of course. Note however that of the handful of transitions back to work more
than half are into self-employment.
2.5 Institutional Variation in Social Security Legislation and Pensions
Whereas the preceding tables have documented the large variation across countries in
terms of labor market patterns and institutions in general, it is important to know in how
far institutional arrangements differ for the self-employed vis-a-vis wage employed.
Table 8 gives a short account on coverage of self-employed in social security systems
across the countries of interest. The differences between countries are too vast to be de-
tailed in much depth (see for instance, Schoukens (2000) for a more comprehensive survey
and European Commission (2001) for further institutional description). Broadly, in most
countries the self-employeds’ social insurance provisions are integrated in a national in-
surance system that also covers employees. In some countries, the self-employed are fully
integrated (such as in Sweden), in others there are special provisions within the national
system (such as Germany). A few countries have separate systems for the self-employed.
Scandinavian systems are more easily characterized as being universal and compulsory:
they tend to be tax-financed and eligibility is assessed by residence; there is typically no
distinction between the employed and the self-employed. Similarly for the Netherlands,
where social insurances are paid for by premia, and where some special insurances exist
(or existed) for the self-employed (in particular disability).
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Table 8: Social Security for the Self-employed
general industry unem- employment disability, old survivor long-term
country system specific ploym. injuries invalidity age benefits care
Austria SSSE AG, RT AG: n.a. yes permanent yes yes; yes
other: disability if survivor
voluntary only continues
business,
takes over
pension
claims
Belgium SSSE no n.a. n.a. yes yes yes nsc
Switzerland NI no n.a. voluntary yes; yes; yes; nsc
compulsory basic plan
voluntary 2nd pillar
Germany SPNI AG, RT n.a. yes yes; yes; yes; yes
RT: voluntary;
AG: after business termination
Denmark NI no voluntary FI yes yes; supplem. yes yes
only plan: optional
Spain SSSE AG n.a. AG partial yes yes n.a
only
France SSSE AG, CR, n.a. AG industry yes yes nsc
RT compulsory; specific;
other: opt. AG: unfit
for any
agr. work
Greece SSSE AG, RT n.a. yes yes yes yes yes
Italy SPNI no n.a. yes yes yes yes yes
Netherlands NI no n.a. nsc yes yes yes yes
(special
system for
self-empl.)
Sweden NI no voluntary yes yes yes yes ./.
Sources: European Commission (2001); US Social Security Administration, website. Abbreviations: AG – agriculture; CR –
crafts; FI – fishing & navigation; RT – retail NI – national, compulsory insurance with universal coverage SSSE – special
system covering self-employed SPNI – special provisions for self-employed within national insurance system n.a. – risk
not covered; nsc – risk not separately covered (no special plan) ./. – no information
Some countries differentiate treatment according to industry. In particular agricul-
ture has special provisions. In terms of the main risks covered by social insurance (we
disregard sickness and maternity provision in this overview), most countries also cover
the self-employed, at least on an optional basis. An exception is, for instance, Belgium
where employment-specific injuries or occupational hazards are not covered for the self-
employed, or Spain, where disability and invalidity insurances are less generous for the
self-employed. Germany requires farmers to discontinue their businesses for benefit eli-
gibility in the categories disability or invalidity, old age, and survivor’s pensions. Retail
business owners have the option of being covered under the German social security sys-
tem.
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The largest difference between risks across countries concerns unemployment insur-
ance. Possibly for reasons of moral hazard, unemployment (business termination due
to, say, bankruptcy) is not covered for the self-employed, with the exceptions of Sweden,
Denmark, and Austria. In Austria, farmers have their own social insurance fund which
does not provide for covering unemployment risk. Self-employed in other occupations
have the option of joining the general unemployment insurance, however. The Danish
unemployment insurance is organized around occupational unemployment funds, which
provide the self-employed with the option of joining. Likewise, Swedish self-employed
may join the unemployment fund for their industry.
3 Estimation Results
We now turn to estimating regression models controlling for a number of relevant covari-
ates.24 For the analyses in Sections 3.1 through 3.3 we rely on cross-sectional evidence.
The time variation in the data is limited, preventing us from applying fixed effects (first
difference) estimators here. In addition, not all variables available in wave 1 are also avail-
able in wave 2. When we consider actual transitions into retirement, in Section 3.4, we do
exploit the panel feature of the data.
3.1 Characterizing the Self-employed
Table 9 displays marginal effects from probits of being self-employed in either primary or
secondary job (the reference group is wage employed) for the working sample.
Table 9 about here
Columns 1-2 contain baseline estimates controlling for age, education, further demo-
graphics, wealth, income, country fixed effects, and industry.
Out of the 4,000 observations somewhat more than 1,000 are self-employed. The Pseudo-
R2 of around 16% indicates a reasonably good fit, compared to most of what is available
elsewhere in the empirical literature; the self-employed are often hard to characterize in
terms of observables.
24In what follows, all Tables with regression results are based on multiple imputation estimates to cor-
rect for the fact that there is uncertainty about any one imputed value. To help replicability, we use the
multiply imputed values distributed by the data provider. The use of multiple imputation techniques does
not change conclusions compared to using only singly imputed variables. t−values displayed are based on
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. We apply a threshold value of at most 5% throughout when refer-
ring to ‘significant’ parameter estimates.
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We find a quadratic age effect.25 The overall pattern is that the probability of being
self-employed increases with age in the sample, and in particular in age ranges beyond
standard retirement age the likelihood of being self-employed becomes large. This accords
with Figure 1.
Education coefficients seem to suggest that higher educated individuals are more likely
to be self-employed. In particular in the group with the highest recorded education level
the likelihood to be working for oneself is remarkably high. A Wald test also rejects that
the education dummy variables as a group are insignificant.
Foreign-born individuals are 9% less likely to be self-employed, on average, than native-
born. This finding is not consistent with the simple ‘push’ view that foreign-born workers
are disadvantaged in domestic labor markets26 and select into self-employment because
wage employment possibilities are difficult to obtain.
Marital status matters for being self-employed. Wald tests on joint siginficance show
the dummy variable group to be jointly significant. Never-married single persons are 10%
more likely to be self-employed than married or cohabiting individuals.
Private net worth is a strong correlate of being self-employed, as has been documented
elsewhere.27 The presumption exists in the literature that either liquidity constraints make
it hard for potentially self-employed to get started, so they need to accumulate wealth in
order to build up collateral they can borrow against or that the self-employed have a larger
saving rate (for instance, because they are less covered by public sector pension arrange-
ments, not to speak of employer-sponsored or occupational pension schemes, or because
of precautionary reasons). A million euros are associated with a 6 percentage points higher
likelihood to be self-employed. We return to issues of potential endogeneity of wealth be-
low, when we discuss other estimates and provide instrumental-variables estimates.
Lastly, income is also positively associated with being self-employed, but not signifi-
cantly so. Income is household income of all members, net of the individual’s own income
from work or self-employment.28
We stratify the sample into 11 industries, with ‘education and health’ being the omitted
category. We see from the estimates that almost all industry coefficients are positive, so
being self-employed is least likely in public-sector industries. Agriculture (and mining),
25We have tried alternative specifications, using cubic age polynomials or splines. Using a parsimonious
quadratic yields a relatively tight fit on the small age window.
26Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for instance, provide evidence for discrimination in labor markets.
27see, for instance, Gentry and Hubbard, 2004 or Hurst and Lusardi, 2004, and the references therein.
28Income may or may not be endogenous to being self-employed. We have no suitable instruments that
allow a more precise assessment. Leaving income out of the equation, or including income from own work
or self-employment, has negligible effects on the remaining coefficients and their standard errors, so that we
believe there is no endogeneity bias.
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retail and wholesale, other services, and construction, are significantly more likely to be
populated by self-employed workers.29
Country effects reflect the overall differences of self-employment rates between coun-
tries, as previously established in Table 2.30
The cross-sectional patterns discussed here are correlates of self-employment and do
not necessarily show causal effects of exogenous variation on self-employment. For in-
stance, it is conceivable that there are strong selection effects present and that persons we
observe to be self-employed at age 50 or above have different characteristics from those
that ever entered self-employment. For instance, the education effects may reflect the
skilled ones to survive in self-employment, whereas the unskilled ones return to wage
employment. Whereas the descriptive evidence on the dynamics presented in Section 2.4
above points to high persistence, the data at hand do not allow an investigation of long-
run effects and life cycle career paths.
We can at most include job tenure as a regressor. Results (not displayed) show, how-
ever, that tenure is not a statistically significant correlate of self-employment, once we
condition on everything else.
Column 3-4 of Table 9 repeat the analysis but now also control for a number of other
characteristics, such as occupation and job attributes, as well as expected pension claims.
The regression is only included here for illustrative purposes as it uncovers a number of
other important correlates of self-employment. For instance, we see that the self-employed
are less likely to be associated with purely operative or elementary functions, and some-
what more associated with occupations of higher skill levels (the reference group is profes-
sionals). Occupation is correlated with education and here is where coefficient estimates
are most affected.
Turning to job attributes that respondents could rate31 we find that many of the signs
of the estimated marginal effects conform with intuition: being self-employed is strongly
positively correlated with jobs that are physically demanding, offer little freedom, allow
high skill development, give a high recognition, and offer poor job security. Being self-
employed is also strongly negatively correlated with jobs that offer adequate support in
29These patterns are broadly consistent with those for all ages, see OECD data, fn. 9.
30We have also estimated the models separately by country. Sample sizes are substantially lower. The
overall fit of the regression equation differs strongly between countries (from 13% in Spain to 65% in Sweden),
and coefficient estimates often do not line up between countries. This as such is not surprising, considering
that self-employment rates between countries have a lot to do with differences in cultures and institutions
that interact in complicated ways with personal characteristics.
31Each attribute is measured on a 4-point Likert scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ with certain
statements; we display coefficients on dummy variables relating to ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’. Ways of
reducing the number of regressors have been considered by using factor analysis or constructing an index of
job quality and effort-reward-imbalance (Siegrist et al., 2004). Results are available on request.
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difficult situations, or poor job advancement/promotion. There are no large differences
between wage and self-employed when it comes to workload or remuneration.
The latter findings are intersting because we will show below that the self-employed
work longer, but apparently their work load is not perceived particularly high. The in-
difference with respect to earnings is consistent with the nonsignificance of income noted
above. Job attributes are possibly jointly chosen with self-employment, and we thus will
not consider these in what follows.
Lastly, we use a number of indicators for possible future pension claims. Respondents
could indicate a number of pension sources that they believe to be eligible for in the future,
and we group them in to four nonexclusive categories (one of them is ‘missing’ which
captures mainly don’t know answers). The self-employed are less likely to have old age or
early retirement pension eligibility, but are often not able to answer questions on eligiblity.
Column 5-6 of Table 9 are included for completeness. This is the specification we use
later in some models when discussing selection effects. While the list of regressors differs
slightly from the baseline, it is important to stress that between specifications the common
parameter estimates and marginal effects are quite close to one another.
3.2 Hours Worked
Descriptive evidence provided in Section 2.4 above suggested that the self-employed work
longer hours on average, and we confirm these patterns to hold even conditional on other
observables, including, importantly, age and health. Table 10 displays results of linear
regressions of the number of hours worked per week.32
Table 10 about here
Columns 1-2 is a baseline specification without controlling for industry. Again, there
are about 4,000 observations, and the cross-sectional goodness of fit stastic is with 13%
high by comparison. The self-employed work about 11 hours more per week than compa-
rable employees. This is a substantial difference (the average is about 42 hours per week
in the sample). Characteristics age, education, and other demographics, health, wealth,
and country fixed effects cannot explain the difference away.
The age function indicates an increasingly decreasing labor supply with age, in line
with expectations. Educational differences cannot be detected. Foreign-born individuals
work less (on average, 2.7 hours less per week). Marital status is entirely unimportant.
32The estimated equation deviates from a standard labor supply function in that we do not condition on
the hourly wage rate, which is not directly observed. In addition to issues of bias arising from using imputed
hourly wage rates (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999), empirical analysis for self-employed’s labor supply may be
complicated by the marginal wage not being fixed (Farber, 2005).
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As health measures we use an indicator of having a long-term illness, the number of
chronic conditions (self-reported to have been) confirmed by a doctor, and the number of
symptoms. In addition, we condition on the body mass index. In particular those with a
long-term sickness work significantly less.
Country effects are very pronounced, respondents in all countries report (partly sub-
stantially) fewer hours than their counterparts in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.
Industry effects are likewise large. Not surprisingly, perhaps, is the finding that in all
industries working hours are longer than in the reference category of education and health
care (mostly public sector). Hours are particularly long in the self-employment prone
industry of agriculture (and mining). Tenure is excluded but turned out to be insignificant.
The other columns in the Table present variations on the baseline, with the goodness
of fit measure improving only slightly. This suggests that the baseline is a reasonable
depiction of salient correlates of hours worked. The coefficient estimates of the baseline
are typically not significantly altered, and standard errors stay in the neighborhood of
baseline estimates.
Column 3-4 controls for occupation. Occupation is of course strongly correlated with
both education and self-employment, and we see some, but no dramatic changes in the as-
sociated coefficient estimates. Managers (and workers in other administrative functions)
work longer, as do farm workers; elementary operators and workers work less (all com-
pared to professionals, the reference category).
Column 5-6 allows the self-employment indicator to be country-specific. In some coun-
tries the self-employed actually work less than in other countries (large negative and sta-
tistically significant coefficients are found for Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden). We take
away from this that self-employment allows for substantial hours-worked flexibility.
The last columns in Table 10 exclude marital status but include income and wealth,
compared to the baseline. Income appears to have a large positive effect.
We now consider the possibility that self-employment is potentially endogenous to
hours worked. This could be the case, for instance, if unobserved characteristics that
make individuals likely to work longer are also the ones that support a choice to be self-
employed. We apply techniques that are particularly useful to study observational (non-
experimental) data.
We pursue two different empirical strategies. One is direct instrumentation of an en-
dogenous dummy variable (IV). The other is allowing self-employed and wage-employed
workers to have different coefficient estimates while modeling the self-employment choice.
This type of model is known as endogenous switching regressions model (see for instance,
Maddala, 1983). It accounts (and hence corrects) for the fact that a difference in hours is
partly generated by certain types sorting into self-employment.
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Underlying the employment dummy s is a stochastic process that determines employ-
ment mode: a person i is self-employed whenever the latent variable s? exceeds some
threshold value. This latent variable is modeled by a function of observable characteristics
z and an error term ε,
s?i = z
′
iγ+ ε i. (1)
The observability rule is
si = 1[s?i > 0]
where 1[A] is the 0/1 indicator function taking value 1 whenever expression A is true.
The instrumental variable model can be estimated by full information maximum like-
lihood, estimating jointly equation (1) and the hours worked equation,
hi = x′iβ+ siδ+ νi. (2)
Instrumentation of si requires exclusion restrictions for nonparametric identification. We
rely on marital status and wealth that have been shown earlier to matter for self-employ-
ment (Table 9) but not for hours worked (Table 10). Results are in the first columns of Table
11.
Table 11 about here
Instead of discussing particular coefficient estimates in greater detail it suffices to point
out the high stability compared to the uninstrumented case. We find a significant negative
coefficient on instrumented self-employment in the hours worked equation (the coefficient
drops from 10.9 to 8.8 hours), but cannot reject the hypothesis that equations (1) and (2)
are independent.33
The switching regressions model is a more flexible generalization that postulates that
hours worked are generated from two different distributions, according to whether a per-
son is wage or self-employed. Hours worked is then one of two types, s = 0, 1, h1 for a
self-employed individual and h0 for a wage employed person. Each hs is described by its
own statistical model, and selection into group s is governed by the selection equation (1).
The hours equation then depends on the chosen type s:
hsi = x′iβs + νsi, s = 0, 1. (3)
So, while there are two potential outcomes, h0 and h1, for each individual, only one of
them is actually observed in the data, according to
hi =
{
h0i if s?i ≤ 0
h1i if s?i > 0
.
33We have alternatively also used a linear IV model which we estimate by GMM to allow for a very general
error structure. The self-employment equation is a linear probability model. Results are available on request.
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Importantly, the selection mechanism governing the choice of regime depends on unob-
servables. It models the non-random decision to join one regime rather than the other. The
error distributions need not be identical between regimes (nor between individuals of the
same regime). To estimate the model, we shall assume that the vector ξi = (ν0i, ν1i, ε i) for
person i follows a trivariate normal distribution with suitable restrictions on the covari-
ance matrix to achieve identification (the variance of ε i is set to unity and the correlation
between ν0i and ν1i is set to zero). All ξi are independently distributed. We may wish to
allow for nonidentical distributions between individuals to account for heteroskedasticity.
Exclusion restrictions are the same as before.34
Mean hours of self-employed who selected into self-employment can be calculated as
E(h1|s = 1) = E(h1|s? > 0) = E(h1|ε > −z′γ) = x1β1 + σ1ε φ(z
′γ)
Φ(z′γ)
(4)
whereas mean hours of wage employed who selected into wage employment are
E(h0|s = 0) = E(h0|s? ≤ 0) = E(h0|ε ≤ −z′γ) = x0β0 − σ0ε φ(z
′γ)
1−Φ(z′γ) . (5)
The model allows calculating counterfactual conditional means, i.e., determining the ex-
pected hours worked for a wage employee (someone with wage employed coefficients)
had he been made to become self-employed,
E(h0|s = 1) = E(h0|s? > 0) = E(h0|ε > −z′γ) = x0β0 + σ0ε φ(z
′γ)
Φ(z′γ)
(6)
or the mean hours that someone with self-employed coefficients would supply in wage
employment35
E(h1|s = 0) = E(h1|s? ≤ 0) = E(h1|ε ≤ −z′γ) = x1β1 − σ1ε φ(z
′γ)
1−Φ(z′γ) . (7)
Results show that wage employed and self-employed differ in the observed determi-
nants of hours worked, as well as in the estimated error distributions. The variance is
much larger for the self-employed, and the correlation between (1) and the self-employment
hours equation in (3) is quite large and significant: the unobservables that make someone
more likely to be self-employed also increase hours supplied.
The signs of the estimated correlations show that expected selectivity-corrected hours
of wage employees are larger than the population mean (the mean number of hours sup-
plied by a person that were randomly drawn from the wage employee population without
34We have also considered variations in which a subset or all of the elements of βs are constrained to be
equal across types s. If only the intercept differs, the model reduces to the IV model discussed earlier.
35Martinez-Granado (2005) estimates such a model for hours in a different context using GMM and panel
data. The common ground with her paper is the assumption that the underlying distributions of hours
worked are different for two observable but self-chosen subgroups in the population, prominently through
the added flexibility of labor supply that membership of one of the two groups affords.
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it being given the choice in which sector to work), and the mean hours supplied by self-
employed is again larger than the population mean, indicating positive selection. The
estimate of the hours differential conditional on their self-selected respective employment
states equals 10.4 hours ((4)-(5)). The counterfactual means suggest that someone who
is actually observed to be self-employed would work 11 hours less in wage employment
than in self-employment ((4)-(6)).36 Such pronounced differences are remarkable, and can
possibly be reconciled with the existence of specific returns to self-employment that self-
employment affords.
3.3 Retirement Reasons and Retirement Wishes
Table 12 investigates for the retiree sample in how far there are differences between former
self-employed and wage employees when it comes to reasons for having retired in the past.
The question probed asked ‘for which reasons did you retire’, and there were 10 explicit
reasons mentioned, plus a residual category ‘other’. These reasons are displayed in the
Table. Multiple answers were allowed, although most respondents chose a single reason.
Table 12 about here
We estimate separate probit models, controlling for many of the important charac-
teristics that we include elsewhere, to the extent that these are available for the sample
(among which, demographics, health status, wealth, pension income, country dummies).
The Table only displays the marginal effect of the self-employment dummy variable on
the outcome probability.37 Interesting differences with the group of wage employees can
be found: the self-employed are 5 percentage points more likely to retire for each reason
of ‘own ill health’ and ‘to enjoy life’. They are also more likely to retire at the same time
as their spouse or partner, or to spend time with their families (these latter two effects are
only significantly different from zero at the 10% level, however). In addition, they are more
likely to retire for other reasons than those mentioned explicitly. We interpret these results
as evidence that self-employment offers substantial degrees of freedom when it comes to
choosing the date of retirement.
Country dummies show the strongest marginal effects. For instance, placing a person
with average characteristics from Germany to Denmark would decrease his probability
36Results are unaffected if we do not condition on occupation, or restrict certain coefficients in (1), such as
health and occupation, to zero. Results also do not change appreciably if we do not use wealth as an exclusion
restriction or leave it out altogether.
37We have also estimated multinomial models. Due to the large number of motives and the small amounts
of observations in some of the multiple-answer cells, substantial aggregation of motives was called for. Ex-
ploratory results can be obtained on request.
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of retiring for eligibility of public pension schemes by 29 percentage points; placing him
instead to Austria would increase this probability by 31 percentage points.
We also allow for country-specific differences between wage employees and self-em-
ployed. Instead of displaying separate marginal effects the Table provides the p−value of a
Wald test of joint significance of coefficients as a summary measure. Reasons where we can
expect differences across countries due to institutional variation (pension arrangements,
health systems) show a low p−value. Reasons that are more associated with preferences
(care for ill health of relatives or friends, to spend more time with family, and to ‘enjoy
life’) do not exhibit significant variation across countries, however.
Conversely, we can consider the group of working individuals and probe whether they
want to retire ‘as early as [they] can’ from their current job. While this statement does
not make explicit possible trade-offs in terms of financial incentives for earlier or later
retirement, it is indicative of ‘work ethics’ or attachment to work, once we control for
other job-related characteristics, demographics, and country. Table 13 presents marginal
effects from four variations of a probit equation.
Table 13 about here
Columns 1-2 present the baseline case where we condition on age, demographics,
health, income, wealth and country dummies. Being self-employed as such reduces the
wish to retire as early as possible by ten percentage points. This is a very substantial dif-
ference. Age correlates negatively with wishing to retire as early as possible, indicating
the importance of the retirement horizon in the face of mostly actuarially unfair retire-
ment systems (the further respondents are removed from standard retirement age, the
more inclined they are to retire early). The education gradient is very pronounced—the
more educated the less the desire for early retirement. Marital status (singles do not wish
to retire as early as couples), and health (the sick want to leave early) score importantly
and significantly. Neither wealth nor income matters. These findings are fully robust to
inclusion of industry and occupation effects (columns 3-4).
The remaining columns are to be understood of exploratory analyses that probe fur-
ther correlations of interest. Including in addition job characteristics (as well as hours
worked) reduces the marginal effect of self-employment to minus seven percentage points,
see columns 5-6. People that are very satisfied with their jobs have a 25 percentage point
lower probability to wish to retire as early as possible. Further, jobs that are giving a freer
choice of how to work, and that provide recognition of one’s efforts are associated with
sometimes markedly lower probabilities to wishing to retire as early as possible. Con-
versely, heavy jobs induce the wish to withdraw early. Interestingly, it is unimportant
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whether the job held offers good or bad job security.38 Finally, those that work longer
hours are slightly less likely to want to retire early. Together with the industry and occu-
pation dummies, these results strongly suggest that work characteristics are an important
driving force of the desire to leave into retirement.
Columns 7-8, finally, also include future pension claim expectations. Those that are
eligible to retire early also say they wish to retire early. The estimate on self-employment
is only slightly affected, many other coefficients are largely unaffected.
What all this suggests is that the self-employed are attached to work beyond being in
a favorable environment, and other observables. These results are hence in line with the
earlier findings of the switching regressions model on hours worked.
3.4 Retirement Behavior
To analyze actual retirement, we use wave-2 information on year and month of retirement.
The sample conditions on those working in the first wave. We flag those that report in the
second wave a date of retirement that lies after the interview of the first wave. This applies
to nearly 13%.39 Table 14 shows results for a choice of specifications.
Table 14 about here
The baseline (columns 1-2) conditions on age, demographics, health, income and wealth,
and again on country dummies. The regression function is very well determined with a
Pseudo-R2 of 27%. The self-employed are on average four percentage points less likely
to retire, conditional on all included observables. Given the base of 13%, this is a very
substantial effect. Age effects are in line with expectations and drive much of the fit of the
model. The highest educated retire latests. Marital status and health are strong predictors,
as we had also found in earlier analyses (Tables 12 and 13). Health variables are jointly
significant, and the number of illness symptoms is positively associated with a retirement
decision. The magnitude is small, however.
Modeling work by Wooley (2005) suggests that higher wealth holdings (relative to
earnings) can be predicted to be a prime determinant of retirement transition: the wealth-
ier retire earlier as wealth affords enjoying leisure during retirement (while forgoing earn-
ings). Our results suggest, however, that wealth does not matter, quite in line with the
empirical finding in Wooley (2005).40
Columns 3-4 deviate from the definition of a newly retired person and only flag those
38These findings also are robust to a full interaction of self-employment with all job characteristics.
39Note that the interview dates, and hence the spacing between interviews, differs somewhat between
countries, but results are unchanged if we explicitly condition on interview quarter.
40In his case, retirement is determined entirely in the cross-section.
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that in wave 2 do not say they work for money despite considering themselves retired.
This definition makes a difference to parameter estimates, and the marginal effect of being
self-employed changes to -1.8 percentage points. Since the base is diminished as well (only
4.5% of wave-1 respondents retire completely from activity between waves), the relative
effect for the self-employed is actually stronger, in line with expectations on flexibility of
continued work reported above.
Column 5-6 return to the baseline sample of columns 1-2 but adds industry dummies,
pension claim expectations and self-employment/country interactions. The latter allow
for additional flexibility to capture institutional differences in retirement systems between
the wage employed and self-employed. These interaction terms are significant as a group.
There is evidence that especially the interaction term for Italian self-employed is strongly
significantly negative. This is consistent with the institutional setting in Italy where retire-
ment incentives for wage earners in particular are strong, but not for the self-employed.41
Adding occupational dummies or job characteristics appears not to be empirically im-
portant (results are not included in the Table), unlike in the assessment of the wish to retire
early, Table 13. This points to a deviation between wishes and realizations. In the end, it
is institutions and age that determine retirement and not correlates of retirement prefer-
ences. We have also allowed for country-specific age profiles in auxiliary regressions. We
found them to be significant for only two countries (Sweden and Denmark).
Wealth is possibly endogenous to retirement. Life-cycle wealth accumulation will be
jointly chosen with life-cycle labor supply and retirement decisions, and saving partly
occurs in order to finance consumption during retirement (Diamond and Hausman, 1984).
Brown et al. (2010), for instance, suggest to use shocks to wealth (unexpected receipt of
inheritances) in order to study a revision of the retirement decision.
Instruments are hard to come by. We have used regional statistics published by OECD
on, for instance, GDP growth, but found them not to be highly correlated with wealth.
Regional house price indexes only exist for selected countries and not on a comparable
basis. Instead, we rely on predicted home values. These are based on regressions of ob-
served home values of home owners in our sample on observable home characteristics,
and subsequently averaged per NUTS area. As instruments we then use these averaged
predicted home values, an indicator of whether the household lives in a big city, and the
41The marginal effects displayed in Table 14 are simple differences in probabilities for the cases where the
interaction effect (itself being a 0/1 dummy variable) is switched on or off. In nonlinear models such as
the probit these magnitudes do not necessarily correspond to analytical marginal interaction effects, which
vary in the sample and depend on the data (e.g., Greene, 2010). Instead, we have checked the coefficient
estimates in the probit and in a linear probability model to come to our conclusion, and do not emphasize
other ‘significant’ interaction terms in the Table.
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interaction of both.42 We find the instruments to be jointly significant predictors, without
the hypothesis of exogeneity being rejected. Column 7-8 show the associated second stage
marginal effects for completeness, but we abstain from further discussion.
3.5 Sensitivity Analyses
We offer a brief account of additional sensitivity analyses conducted without displaying
detailed results. Importantly, the estimates are robust to changes in specifciations.
Self-employment. The definition of self-employment is entirely based on self-reports,
and there are no alternatives in the data. The measure entertained in the analyses might
slightly overcount the self-employed to the extent that there are people that have a main
job as a wage earner and are involved in, say, marginal freelance activities in a secondary
job. It might also blur the estimates obtained as the environmental parameters pertaining
to wage earners could be more relevant for this particular group (which is limited in size,
however, see Table 2).
The results are largely unaffected when excluding the second-job self-employed, across
the various analyses that we have presented so far. One difference concerns a slightly
lower self-employment coefficient in the hours worked equation. There is no effect on the
retirement transition, however.
Health. We chose to measure health by self-reported, but interpersonally comparable
measures. Among the alternative measures available features a self-reported summary
classification of general health, on a five-point categorical scale (‘would you say your
health is: (1) excellent. . . (5) poor.’). We use four dummy variables. Results for the health
measure coefficients conform with expectations, and virtually all other parameter esti-
mates in other regressions are unaffected. Such measures are standard in the literature but
have recently come under attack by the criticism of lacking interpersonal comparability
(Salomon et al., 2004).
The number of limitations in activities of daily living (ADL, e.g. ‘walking across a
room’) and in instrumental ADL (e.g. ‘managing money’) have also been considered.
These are often more relevant for the already retired population, and those that are retir-
ing. Number of limitations in ADL are correlated with our number of symptoms measure
and point in the same direction.
The retirement transition regression (Table 14) has also been estimated using changes
in the health measures that we used earlier. The explanatory power of these is rather low,
however. Parameters of interest are unaffected.
42First stage results are available on request.
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Wealth. The wealth measure chosen in this paper is private (non-business) net worth,
which is the relevant margin when studying decisions of hours worked, for instance,
where we relate labor supply behavior to resources available for consumption purposes.
Total net worth including business wealth is perhaps more relevant for the retirement
margin. We find no important differences, however. Inspection of the imputed business
wealth variable reveals a large number of zero values among the self-employed, and it is
not clear how well the variable actually captures business equity.
4 Conclusions
This paper offers a comprehensive and judicious descriptive analysis of labor supply and
retirement behavior of the self-employed vis-a-vis the wage employed. The data is drawn
from the pan-European SHARE survey that samples the population of residents born before
1955 in eleven different countries. We focus on male heads of households in the age range
50-75.
Institutional differences between the various countries in terms of incentives for labor
force market behavior at the end of the working life cycle are arguably large and important.
Social security and old-age pension systems differ not only across countries but also within
countries for the wage employed and the self-employed.
We find that self-employment at older working ages offers substantial flexibility in
many regards. The hours-worked distribution of the self-employed is substantially less
spiked than that of wage employees, spans a much wider range and has a much larger
variance. The self-employed work on average a good 10 more hours per week and are
more than 4 percentage points less likely to retire in the span of 2 years than observa-
tionally equivalent wage workers. These findings survive when we control for individual
characteristics capturing preferences and circumstances, for economic resources, and for
institutional variation that is afforded by our multi-country data source.
An endogenous switching regression model suggests a strong effect—mainly via unob-
servables—of self-selection of certain types of individuals to choose self-employment and
to (subsequently) supply more hours.
The analysis of retirement behavior reveals that the definition of retirement plays some
role. We can consider whether we include among the retirees those that continue working
for money (while, for instance, drawing pension income). Self-employment is particularly
important for this group, and less so for those that are going to stop working altogether. A
residual effect survives even here. The remaining variation may possibly be attributable to
unobserved factors such as work ethic, or otherwise strong attachment to work and busi-
ness (or a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution) as prime candidates for determining
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the self-employeds’ life cycle labor supply behavior.
Job tenure information provides evidence that the self-employed in the sample have
chosen their employment mode already early on in life, and have been successful in their
entrepreneurial endeavours. For future research it will be important to understand the
role of unobservables in the dynamic selection into entrepreneurship and the implication
of business survival for retirement behavior. Our evidence is consistent with positive se-
lection on unobservables of hard-working individuals into self-employment, which at the
same time is conducive to survival in self-employment, a large supply of hours to the mar-
ket, and work until late in life. Corroborative evidence could come from long panel data.
Understanding these pathways is important for policy conclusions.
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A Tables
Table 9: Self-employment and Characteristics
baseline full selection
variable marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value
age -0.1250 -3.39 -0.0890 -2.58 -0.1149 -3.14
age2/100 0.1182 3.68 0.0852 2.83 0.1092 3.42
edu.: (lower) secondary 0.0344 1.34 0.0309 1.20 0.0330 1.26
edu.: (upper) secondary 0.0133 0.58 -0.0115 -0.50 -0.0141 -0.61
edu.: post-sec., non-tertiary 0.0388 0.83 -0.0164 -0.38 0.0090 0.19
edu.: 1st tertiary 0.0615 2.41 -0.0125 -0.47 -0.0018 -0.07
edu.: 2nd tertiary 0.2155 2.57 0.0634 0.80 0.1504 1.84
edu.: other 0.0523 0.63 0.0244 0.27 0.0149 0.18
foreign-born -0.0923 -3.82 -0.0773 -3.37 -0.0804 -3.24
household size 0.0165 2.21 0.0171 2.28 0.0182 2.45
marital st.: nvr. married 0.1014 2.82 0.1269 3.26 0.1032 2.77
marital st.: widowed 0.0179 0.33 -0.0170 -0.33 0.0213 0.38
marital st.: div./sep. 0.0495 1.62 0.0682 2.09 0.0661 2.07
private net worth (m EUR) 0.0564 3.88 0.0420 3.77 0.0504 3.86
other hh income (100k EUR) 0.0068 1.31 0.0028 0.72 0.0045 0.96
long-term sickness 0.0214 1.20
number of chronic conditions -0.0100 -1.19
number of symptoms -0.0092 -1.15
body mass index 0.0002 0.13
Austria -0.0034 -0.09 0.0173 0.44 0.0117 0.29
Belgium -0.0425 -1.49 -0.0496 -1.82 -0.0529 -1.90
Switzerland 0.1062 2.39 0.1111 2.28 0.0559 1.30
Denmark -0.0567 -1.86 0.0926 1.79 -0.0444 -1.42
Spain 0.0206 0.54 0.0555 1.32 0.0048 0.13
France -0.0774 -2.79 -0.0364 -1.18 -0.0726 -2.62
Greece 0.1369 3.80 0.1463 3.79 0.1541 4.04
Italy 0.1680 3.95 0.1483 3.40 0.1691 3.90
Netherlands -0.1175 -4.71 -0.0904 -2.92 -0.1060 -4.20
Sweden -0.0717 -2.89 -0.0848 -3.44 -0.0781 -3.18
ind.: missing 0.4491 12.66 0.4226 8.73 0.4812 11.53
ind.: other -0.0638 -0.97 -0.0360 -0.55 -0.0617 -0.96
ind.: agriculture & mining 0.4692 7.97 0.3009 3.87 0.3522 4.79
ind.: manuf., low tech 0.0952 2.69 0.0891 2.25 0.1299 3.31
ind.: manuf., high tech 0.0411 0.94 0.0315 0.71 0.0619 1.31
ind.: supplies & construction 0.1661 4.46 0.0970 2.40 0.1565 3.88
ind.: wholesale, retail 0.3872 10.27 0.3177 6.80 0.3606 8.53
ind.: transp., comm., finance 0.0429 1.22 0.1153 2.67 0.1338 3.23
ind.: other sophisticated 0.0440 1.37 0.0544 1.59 0.0530 1.60
ind.: other services 0.2530 5.31 0.2600 4.82 0.2949 5.85
occ.: missing -0.1519 -8.27 -0.1530 -6.30
occ.: other, inc. armed forces -0.1248 -3.63 -0.1531 -4.42
occ.: admin./managerial 0.0466 1.75 0.0658 2.46
occ.: technicians -0.0556 -2.39 -0.0530 -2.22
occ.: clerks -0.1947 -15.69 -0.2271 -18.77
occ.: service/sales workers -0.0803 -2.85 -0.0965 -3.35
continued overleaf
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Table 9: Self-employment and Characteristics (continued)
baseline full selection
variable marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value
occ.: skilled farm worker 0.1799 2.77 0.1881 3.10
occ.: craftsmen -0.0310 -1.11 -0.0403 -1.49
occ.: operators -0.1226 -5.72 -0.1546 -7.76
occ.: elementary occupations -0.1518 -8.09 -0.1761 -9.17
job: v. satisfied -0.0313 -1.07
job: satisfied -0.0408 -1.50
job: v. phys. demanding 0.0979 4.09
job: phys. demanding 0.0743 3.81
job: v. heavy workload 0.0245 1.22
job: heavy workload 0.0339 2.00
job: v. little freedom 0.1474 6.33
job: little freedom 0.0724 3.68
job: v. high skill develop. 0.0942 3.58
job: high skill development 0.0638 3.28
job: v. much supported -0.1362 -8.37
job: supported -0.1184 -7.09
job: high recognition 0.0645 2.30
job: recognition 0.0296 1.57
job: v. adequate pay 0.0402 1.53
job: adequate pay -0.0174 -1.04
job: v. poor promotion -0.1093 -6.96
job: poor promotion -0.0836 -5.42
job: v. poor job security 0.0701 2.37
job: poor job security 0.0105 0.52
expect pension claim: old age -0.0412 -3.29
expect pension claim: early ret. -0.1393 -4.31
expect pension claim: other 0.0584 1.92
expect pension claim: missing 0.2263 2.90
Number of observations 4077 3880 4061
log-likelihood -1980.56 -1575.22 -1844.30
Pseudo-R2 0.1626 0.2869 0.2169
Note: This Table displays marginal effects of a probit model explaining self-employment (total self-
employment from main and secondary job). The sample is all male household heads, aged 50-75. Reference
groups: education levels 0 and 1 (none, pre-primary, or primary); married couples; reference country: Ger-
many; reference industry: education and health and social work; reference occupation: professionals. job:
job characteristics, each with 4 possible answers, coded into dummy variables per characteristic, displaying
‘v.’: ‘strongly agree’, or else ‘agree’; reference groups: ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. All standard er-
rors are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates, all estimates are obtained from multiple imputation
routines. Log-likelihood and Pseudo-R2: refer to values using the first implicate only.
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Table 10: Hours Worked Per Week
baseline + occupation +country-specific base +income &
self-employment wealth, –marit.st.
variable coeff. t−value coeff. t−value coeff. t−value coeff. t−value
self-employed 10.8269 16.19 9.9649 14.70 10.4616 6.79 10.8689 16.01
age 1.6567 1.30 1.4414 1.15 1.3374 1.07 2.0485 1.64
age2/100 -1.5934 -1.42 -1.4152 -1.28 -1.3193 -1.19 -1.9301 -1.75
edu.: (lower) secondary 1.3688 1.53 1.4016 1.55 1.3722 1.54 1.3533 1.51
edu.: (upper) secondary 1.3210 1.57 0.9730 1.12 1.1094 1.31 1.2791 1.52
edu.: post-sec., non-tertiary 0.6119 0.41 0.0052 0.00 0.1411 0.09 0.6174 0.42
edu.: 1st tertiary 2.0641 2.29 1.1673 1.19 1.2868 1.33 2.0857 2.31
edu.: 2nd tertiary 5.3133 2.25 4.3426 1.85 3.6874 1.52 5.1772 2.20
edu.: other -0.6194 -0.24 -1.3915 -0.54 -1.6305 -0.65 -0.7154 -0.27
foreign-born -2.7248 -2.73 -2.1717 -2.18 -2.0209 -2.07 -2.7328 -2.73
household size 0.0219 0.09 0.0601 0.24 0.0391 0.16 0.2003 0.86
marital st.: nvr. married -1.0947 -1.07 -0.9262 -0.91 -0.9522 -0.92
marital st.: widowed -1.0458 -0.58 -0.5257 -0.30 -0.8804 -0.50
marital st.: div./sep. -1.3257 -1.47 -1.1008 -1.22 -1.2995 -1.45
private net worth (m EUR) -0.3068 -1.10
other hh income (100k EUR) 0.5785 6.36
long-term sickness -1.5600 -2.80 -1.5185 -2.75 -1.4701 -2.67 -1.6407 -2.94
number of chronic conditions 0.0759 0.28 0.0437 0.16 0.0204 0.08 0.0706 0.26
number of symptoms 0.3678 1.35 0.4704 1.74 0.4597 1.69 0.3773 1.39
body mass index 0.2047 3.06 0.1847 2.75 0.1891 2.78 0.2031 3.05
Austria -0.1247 -0.11 -0.0238 -0.02 0.8686 0.71 -0.1275 -0.11
Belgium -3.0610 -3.53 -3.2991 -3.88 -3.8846 -4.57 -3.0216 -3.48
Switzerland 0.9659 0.62 0.4685 0.30 1.6146 0.87 1.0393 0.66
Denmark -3.7007 -4.31 -3.5673 -4.21 -3.1372 -3.77 -3.6507 -4.23
Spain -6.3949 -5.25 -6.2855 -5.20 -3.7901 -3.10 -6.5270 -5.44
France -3.0652 -3.58 -3.2763 -3.90 -3.6928 -4.46 -3.1548 -3.70
Greece -8.1924 -7.20 -9.1263 -7.84 -11.6936 -8.12 -8.2134 -7.24
Italy -7.7981 -6.41 -7.7273 -6.42 -5.7863 -4.51 -7.8014 -6.42
Netherlands -4.8796 -6.06 -4.8832 -6.13 -5.1244 -6.72 -4.7453 -5.92
Sweden -2.0562 -2.56 -1.7557 -2.23 -0.7152 -0.93 -1.9383 -2.40
self-empl. in Austria -4.0175 -1.32
self-empl. in Belgium 3.1867 1.30
self-empl. in Switzerland -3.4427 -1.07
self-empl. in Denmark -1.9463 -0.73
self-empl. in Spain -7.9700 -2.84
self-empl. in France 3.2529 1.30
self-empl. in Greece 5.1989 2.14
self-empl. in Italy -4.2201 -1.62
self-empl. in Netherlands 0.8116 0.32
self-empl. in Sweden -5.2290 -2.22
ind.: missing 4.1853 3.81 1.0047 0.84 2.3811 1.92 4.4403 4.04
ind.: other 0.4036 0.14 0.5856 0.19 2.3722 0.79 0.6618 0.22
ind.: agriculture & mining 8.4835 4.71 5.2104 2.83 5.9571 3.21 8.7952 4.83
ind.: manuf., low tech 3.8797 4.21 2.9578 3.05 2.8715 2.97 4.0782 4.44
ind.: manuf., high tech 2.8848 2.94 2.0870 2.06 2.1408 2.15 3.1623 3.24
ind.: supplies & construction 4.2198 4.37 3.3195 3.25 3.3348 3.28 4.4125 4.58
ind.: wholesale, retail 4.0870 3.66 2.1409 1.87 1.9575 1.72 4.3188 3.89
ind.: transp., comm., finance 2.7681 2.83 2.4283 2.39 2.6796 2.64 2.9854 3.05
ind.: other sophisticated 2.9685 3.53 2.3232 2.70 2.2972 2.66 3.1694 3.78
ind.: other services 3.4269 2.39 3.0613 2.16 3.0895 2.19 3.5338 2.47
occ.: missing 8.6393 4.09 7.0510 3.31
occ.: other, inc. armed forces 1.5626 0.92 1.2542 0.72
continued overleaf
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Table 10: Hours Worked Per Week (continued)
baseline + occupation +country-specific base +income &
self-employment wealth, –marit.st.
variable coeff. t−value coeff. t−value coeff. t−value coeff. t−value
occ.: admin./managerial 5.2619 6.27 5.0195 5.97
occ.: technicians 0.6097 0.74 0.4521 0.55
occ.: clerks -1.3124 -1.35 -1.4923 -1.54
occ.: service/sales workers 0.0672 0.05 -0.0119 -0.01
occ.: skilled farm worker 5.8234 3.19 4.9171 2.70
occ.: craftsmen 0.4790 0.52 0.2296 0.25
occ.: operators 0.3944 0.37 0.1031 0.10
occ.: elementary occupations -2.6365 -2.12 -2.7662 -2.23
constant -8.2165 -0.23 -1.0705 -0.03 1.5617 0.04 -20.3741 -0.57
Number of observations 3997 3997 3997 3997
Root MSE 14.446 14.272 14.184 14.426
R2 0.1345 0.1573 0.1699 0.1367
Note: This Table displays coefficients of a linear regression explaining hours worked per week. Self-employment
refers to both main and secondary job. Further notes: see Table 9.
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Table 11: Hours Worked, Self-Selected Self-employment
Endogenous dummy Endog. switching regression model
variable model wage-employed self-employed
variable coeff. t−value coeff. t−value coeff. t−value
self-employed 8.7821 8.52
age 1.6135 1.30 -0.4748 -0.25 -2.0683 -0.96
age2/100 -1.5540 -1.42 0.3571 0.21 1.7970 0.97
edu.: (lower) secondary 1.4075 1.57 -0.2711 -0.31 6.4669 3.00
edu.: (upper) secondary 0.9016 1.05 1.0398 1.25 1.3282 0.63
edu.: post-sec., non-tertiary -0.0140 -0.01 -0.3303 -0.22 0.3689 0.10
edu.: 1st tertiary 1.0965 1.13 2.1972 2.29 -1.5765 -0.68
edu.: 2nd tertiary 4.3309 1.85 3.2074 1.16 8.8648 1.72
edu.: other -1.4587 -0.57 0.2270 0.11 -5.0633 -0.84
foreign-born -2.2388 -2.26 -1.0207 -1.07 -8.2277 -2.58
household size 0.2025 0.88 -0.2639 -1.19 1.3833 2.45
long-term sickness -1.5518 -2.82 -0.8615 -1.61 -2.5499 -1.72
number of chronic conditions 0.0276 0.10 -0.0599 -0.22 -0.3845 -0.55
number of symptoms 0.4720 1.77 0.5436 1.97 -0.1235 -0.18
body mass index 0.1842 2.76 0.1978 2.93 0.1515 0.79
other hh income (100k EUR) 0.4938 4.74 0.4074 4.66 0.8874 5.97
constant -6.7980 -0.19 48.6759 0.91 84.4313 1.35
industry dummies yes yes yes
country dummies yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes yes
σ 14.1786 53.85
σwage employed 12.2998 41.23
σself employed 21.3586 16.27
ρ 0.0444 1.46
ρwage employed -0.0417 -1.15
ρself employed 0.7179 10.78
Sample proportion (%) 73.7 26.3
Overall average hours 40.3 30.3
Self-selected average hours 40.4 50.8
Counterfact. average hours 39.8 23.0
Number of observations 3997 3997
Log-likelihood -18067.48 -17868.56
Wald-test independ. (p-value) 0.4335 0.0000
Note: This Table displays coefficients of linear regressions explaining hours worked per week, correcting for selectiv-
ity. Columns 1-2 refer to an instrumental variable model with endogenous dummy, columns 3-6 refer to a switching
regression model. The selectivity equation in both models is specified as in column 3 of Table 9; actual FIML es-
timates differ very slightly. Exclusion restrictions are marital status indicators and wealth. All equations contain
country, industry and occupation dummies. Further notes: see Table 9.
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Table 13: Wish to Retire Early
baseline + occupation + job + pension
& industry characteristics expectations
variable marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value
self-employed -0.0979 -5.15 -0.0938 -4.50 -0.0668 -2.79 -0.0571 -2.35
age -0.0117 -5.36 -0.0113 -5.17 -0.0086 -3.64 -0.0082 -3.45
edu.: (lower) secondary -0.0435 -1.49 -0.0380 -1.28 -0.0367 -1.16 -0.0375 -1.18
edu.: (upper) secondary -0.0733 -2.79 -0.0528 -1.93 -0.0350 -1.18 -0.0318 -1.07
edu.: post-sec., non-tertiary -0.1362 -2.89 -0.1013 -2.03 -0.0434 -0.80 -0.0408 -0.75
edu.: 1st tertiary -0.2194 -8.68 -0.1624 -5.37 -0.1295 -3.90 -0.1290 -3.88
edu.: 2nd tertiary -0.2365 -4.06 -0.1766 -2.62 -0.1541 -2.07 -0.1641 -2.20
edu.: other -0.1457 -1.73 -0.1073 -1.22 -0.0318 -0.31 0.0161 0.15
foreign-born 0.0177 0.53 0.0021 0.06 -0.0178 -0.50 -0.0096 -0.27
household size -0.0164 -1.89 -0.0153 -1.75 -0.0158 -1.71 -0.0142 -1.52
marital st.: nvr. married -0.0846 -2.40 -0.0925 -2.61 -0.1028 -2.76 -0.1033 -2.75
marital st.: widowed -0.1533 -2.65 -0.1579 -2.71 -0.1579 -2.53 -0.1553 -2.47
marital st.: div./sep. -0.1121 -3.62 -0.1092 -3.49 -0.1209 -3.69 -0.1168 -3.53
long-term sickness 0.0029 0.15 0.0018 0.09 -0.0082 -0.38 -0.0023 -0.10
number of chronic conditions 0.0297 3.04 0.0303 3.07 0.0296 2.85 0.0290 2.78
number of symptoms 0.0427 4.59 0.0403 4.31 0.0199 1.98 0.0206 2.05
body mass index 0.0062 2.69 0.0063 2.72 0.0074 2.97 0.0072 2.89
private net worth (m EUR) -0.0071 -0.86 -0.0053 -0.64 -0.0029 -0.35 -0.0017 -0.20
other hh income (100k EUR) -0.0167 -0.99 -0.0156 -0.96 -0.0107 -0.71 -0.0098 -0.70
Austria 0.0917 2.02 0.0931 2.03 0.1088 2.28 0.1117 2.33
Belgium -0.1114 -3.32 -0.0977 -2.84 -0.0946 -2.56 -0.1055 -2.82
Switzerland -0.1236 -2.86 -0.0989 -2.20 -0.0391 -0.80 -0.0693 -1.39
Denmark -0.0519 -1.35 -0.0419 -1.08 0.0071 0.17 -0.0843 -1.74
Spain 0.1839 4.45 0.1944 4.68 0.2161 4.94 0.2246 5.12
France 0.1278 3.50 0.1358 3.66 0.1737 4.40 0.1692 4.20
Greece 0.0889 2.53 0.1022 2.74 0.0578 1.43 0.0629 1.51
Italy 0.0622 1.48 0.0746 1.75 0.0497 1.10 0.0526 1.15
Netherlands -0.0983 -2.91 -0.0808 -2.28 -0.0552 -1.43 -0.1100 -2.53
Sweden -0.0496 -1.48 -0.0218 -0.62 0.0331 0.89 0.0525 1.37
ind.: missing -0.0206 -0.50 -0.0244 -0.55 -0.0216 -0.49
ind.: other -0.0561 -0.68 -0.0267 -0.31 -0.0208 -0.24
ind.: agriculture & mining -0.0596 -0.90 -0.0315 -0.44 -0.0183 -0.25
ind.: manuf., low tech 0.0048 0.13 0.0235 0.61 0.0254 0.65
ind.: manuf., high tech 0.0687 1.52 0.0694 1.47 0.0779 1.64
ind.: supplies & construction -0.0553 -1.47 -0.0646 -1.63 -0.0599 -1.50
ind.: wholesale, retail 0.0959 2.40 0.0872 2.05 0.0853 2.00
ind.: transp., comm., finance -0.0473 -1.27 -0.0430 -1.08 -0.0396 -0.99
ind.: other sophisticated -0.0456 -1.42 -0.0421 -1.24 -0.0398 -1.17
ind.: other services -0.0118 -0.26 0.0098 0.20 0.0085 0.18
occ.: missing 0.0594 0.98 0.0458 0.70 0.0520 0.79
occ.: other, inc. armed forces -0.0001 -0.00 0.0027 0.04 0.0001 0.00
occ.: admin./managerial 0.0056 0.18 0.0152 0.46 0.0141 0.43
occ.: technicians 0.0499 1.62 0.0462 1.43 0.0436 1.34
occ.: clerks 0.1314 3.12 0.0956 2.13 0.0893 1.98
occ.: service/sales workers -0.0164 -0.37 -0.0708 -1.52 -0.0713 -1.52
occ.: skilled farm worker 0.0992 1.77 0.0196 0.31 0.0221 0.35
occ.: craftsmen 0.0854 2.41 0.0306 0.80 0.0276 0.72
occ.: operators 0.1209 3.07 0.0620 1.43 0.0614 1.41
occ.: elementary occupations 0.1708 4.07 0.1102 2.37 0.1195 2.55
job: v. satisfied -0.2492 -6.55 -0.2558 -6.68
job: satisfied -0.0901 -2.38 -0.0978 -2.56
continued overleaf
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Table 13: Wish to Retire Early (continued)
baseline + occupation + job + pension
& industry characteristics expectations
variable marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value marg.eff. t−value
job: v. phys. demanding 0.1012 3.91 0.1040 4.00
job: phys. demanding 0.0495 2.23 0.0499 2.24
job: v. heavy workload 0.0855 3.40 0.0835 3.30
job: heavy workload 0.0202 0.99 0.0170 0.83
job: v. little freedom -0.0771 -3.05 -0.0773 -3.04
job: little freedom -0.0440 -1.94 -0.0420 -1.84
job: v. high skill develop. -0.0182 -0.64 -0.0213 -0.75
job: high skill development -0.0386 -1.67 -0.0429 -1.84
job: v. much supported -0.0190 -0.64 -0.0228 -0.76
job: supported -0.0111 -0.50 -0.0125 -0.56
job: high recognition -0.0841 -2.73 -0.0793 -2.55
job: recognition -0.0568 -2.46 -0.0534 -2.30
job: v. adequate pay -0.0477 -1.51 -0.0522 -1.65
job: adequate pay -0.0258 -1.27 -0.0270 -1.33
job: v. poor promotion 0.0525 2.09 0.0471 1.87
job: poor promotion 0.0376 1.82 0.0360 1.73
job: v. poor job security -0.0048 -0.14 -0.0093 -0.27
job: poor job security 0.0074 0.30 0.0053 0.22
total hours worked/week -0.0016 -2.46 -0.0016 -2.55
expect pension claim: old age 0.0103 0.65
expect pension claim: early ret. 0.1307 4.11
expect pension claim: other -0.0504 -1.59
expect pension claim: missing -0.0243 -0.36
Number of observations 4034 4034 3819 3805
log-likelihood -2576.75 -2548.63 -2281.24 -2262.64
Pseudo-R2 0.0757 0.0858 0.1364 0.1403
Note: This Table displays marginal effects of probits for wishing to retire ‘as early as you can from’ the present job.
Self-employment refers to both main and secondary job. Sample and further notes: see Table 9.
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Table 14: Probability of Retiring Between Wave 1 and 2
baseline retired only extended same, wealth
if not working baseline instrumented
variable marg.eff.t−value marg.eff.t−value marg.eff.t−value marg.eff.t−value
self-employed -0.0443 -6.05 -0.0178 -4.79 -0.0188 -1.05 0.0035 0.07
age 0.1626 9.79 0.0429 5.16 0.1338 9.00 0.2035 3.05
age2/100 -0.1232 -8.92 -0.0327 -4.78 -0.0996 -8.23 -0.1507 -3.03
edu.: (lower) secondary 0.0102 0.75 -0.0046 -1.06 0.0063 0.57 0.0178 0.80
edu.: (upper) secondary -0.0064 -0.58 -0.0058 -1.30 -0.0042 -0.45 -0.0015 -0.09
edu.: post-sec., non-tertiary -0.0204 -1.40 — — -0.0184 -1.66 -0.0294 -1.18
edu.: 1st tertiary -0.0199 -1.93 -0.0139 -3.24 -0.0152 -1.66 0.0011 0.04
edu.: 2nd tertiary -0.0438 -6.39 -0.0123 -3.94 -0.0357 -6.42 -0.0769 -1.43
edu.: other 0.0324 0.61 — — 0.0330 0.63 0.0329 0.54
foreign-born -0.0149 -1.23 -0.0072 -1.62 -0.0127 -1.33 -0.0141 -0.69
household size -0.0104 -2.44 -0.0042 -2.07 -0.0065 -1.80 -0.0095 -1.43
marital st.: nvr. married -0.0262 -2.60 -0.0085 -2.01 -0.0206 -2.49 -0.0479 -1.33
marital st.: widowed -0.0285 -2.51 -0.0123 -3.96 -0.0216 -2.17 -0.0495 -1.28
marital st.: div./sep. -0.0289 -3.31 -0.0080 -1.92 -0.0218 -2.85 -0.0476 -1.41
long-term sickness 0.0050 0.58 0.0018 0.42 0.0083 1.09 0.0032 0.24
number of chronic conditions -0.0025 -0.61 -0.0012 -0.59 -0.0039 -1.11 -0.0057 -0.98
number of symptoms 0.0080 2.08 0.0020 1.05 0.0064 1.92 0.0075 1.38
body mass index 0.0005 0.56 -0.0002 -0.35 0.0006 0.68 0.0008 0.61
private net worth (m EUR) -0.0011 -0.30 -0.0016 -0.83 -0.0020 -0.58 -0.0977 -0.87
other hh income (100k EUR) -0.0179 -1.55 -0.0023 -0.65 -0.0095 -0.93 -0.0094 -0.61
Austria 0.0801 2.05 0.0391 1.66 0.1134 2.28 0.1257 2.62
Belgium 0.0003 0.02 0.0014 0.20 0.0109 0.67 0.0386 0.98
Switzerland -0.0215 -1.76 -0.0112 -2.95 -0.0202 -1.80 -0.0106 -0.30
Denmark -0.0031 -0.21 -0.0137 -4.09 -0.0283 -3.58 -0.0470 -1.90
Spain -0.0209 -1.64 0.0091 0.75 -0.0110 -0.75 -0.0242 -0.87
France 0.0399 1.60 0.0060 0.62 0.0613 2.02 0.1041 2.05
Greece -0.0406 -4.61 -0.0086 -1.71 -0.0366 -4.15 -0.0705 -1.65
Italy 0.0495 1.67 0.0101 0.79 0.1523 2.73 0.1983 3.13
Netherlands -0.0013 -0.09 -0.0078 -1.62 -0.0055 -0.40 -0.0072 -0.30
Sweden -0.0456 -5.94 -0.0194 -5.04 -0.0328 -4.33 -0.0620 -1.78
ind.: missing 0.0022 0.15 0.0105 0.39
ind.: agriculture & mining -0.0139 -0.85 0.0383 0.40
ind.: manuf., low tech 0.0154 1.08 0.0325 1.13
ind.: manuf., high tech 0.0002 0.02 0.0011 0.05
ind.: supplies & construction 0.0031 0.25 0.0151 0.59
ind.: wholesale, retail -0.0161 -1.64 -0.0184 -0.93
ind.: transp., comm., finance 0.0459 2.07 0.0785 1.83
ind.: other sophisticated 0.0047 0.41 0.0202 0.71
ind.: other services 0.0297 1.23 0.0241 0.82
expect pension claim: old age 0.0009 0.17 -0.0040 -0.37
expect pension claim: early ret. 0.0480 4.56 0.0710 2.75
expect pension claim: other -0.0049 -0.50 -0.0021 -0.12
expect pension claim: missing -0.0011 -0.05 0.0316 0.38
self-empl. in Austria -0.0309 -3.35 -0.0750 -1.19
self-empl. in Belgium -0.0339 -4.41 -0.0750 -1.29
self-empl. in Switzerland -0.0229 -1.49 -0.0500 -1.09
self-empl. in Denmark 0.0388 0.70 0.1837 1.01
self-empl. in Spain -0.0112 -0.45 -0.0042 -0.07
self-empl. in France -0.0150 -0.62 -0.0416 -0.82
self-empl. in Greece 0.0211 0.48 0.0043 0.07
self-empl. in Italy -0.0388 -6.51 -0.0905 -1.19
continued overleaf
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Table 14: Probability of Retiring Between Wave 1 and 2 (continued)
baseline retired only extended same, wealth
if not working baseline instrumented
variable marg.eff.t−value marg.eff.t−value marg.eff.t−value marg.eff.t−value
self-empl. in Netherlands -0.0314 -3.71 -0.0405 -0.84
self-empl. in Sweden -0.0085 -0.33 0.0591 0.50
Number of observations 2738 2621 2704 2704
log-likelihood -753.85 -374.56 -705.87 -4723.98
Pseudo-R2 0.2716 0.2216 0.3124
Note: This Table displays marginal effects of probits for retiring between wave 1 and wave 2 of the survey.
Retirement status is self-reported. In columns 3-4, retirees are only those that do not also work for money at
the same time; two education groups are uninformative in this regression. Self-employment refers to main
job. Further notes: see Table 9. The instrumented model in column 7-8 is only based on the first implicate and
not multiply imputed.
B Figures
continued overleaf
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C Data Definitions
C.1 Industry and Occupation Codes
The SHARE data contain occupation (ISCO) and industry (NACE) codes at low levels of
aggregation. We transform ISCO codes to 1-digit occupations and aggregate armed forces,
and not codeable or invalid answers into ‘other’. We do not classify original responses
‘don’t know’ or ‘refusal’ into ‘missing occupation’. 2-digit industry codes are aggregated
to 1-digit codes with the following exceptions: Codes 01 through 14 are coded ‘agricul-
ture & mining’; codes 15 through 28, 37 (‘recycling’), and 86 (‘production, industry, fac-
tory without further specification’) are coded ‘manuf., low tech.’; codes 29 through 39 (ex-
cept 37) and 88 (‘engineering without further specification’) are coded ‘manuf., high tech’;
codes 40 through 45 are coded ‘supplies and construction’; codes 80 through 89 (excluding
86, 87 (‘services without further specification’), and 88) are coded ‘education, health, and
social work’; codes 90 through 99 and 87 are coded ‘other services’.
C.2 Software Used
Analyses rely on Stata (version 11) routines. For Figure 1 Fortran code by Koehler et al.
(1997) was used. The switching regressions model has been estimated using software
written by Lokshin and Sajaia (2008). Multiple-imputation estimation has been performed
with either Stata routines, or those of Robinson and Blanchette (2009), or were hand-coded.
C.3 Data Acknowledgment
This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.3.0, as of November 13th 2009. SHARE data col-
lection in 2004-2007 was primarily funded by the European Commission through its 5th
and 6th framework programmes (project numbers QLK6-CT-2001- 00360; RII-CT- 2006-
062193; CIT5-CT-2005-028857). Additional funding by the US National Institute on Aging
(grant numbers U01 AG09740-13S2; P01 AG005842; P01 AG08291; P30 AG12815; Y1-AG-
4553-01; OGHA 04-064; R21 AG025169) as well as by various national sources is grate-
fully acknowledged (see http://www.share-project.org for a full list of funding insti-
tutions).
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